A WY

IN 11 1965

POST

TRACE

FOIAb3b

CPYRGHT CIA Defended

I write in answer to Richard Brightson's letter "Without the CIA" (Dec. 23). Having commenced a career as a professional intelligence officer some 30 years ago and served subsequently in ONI, OSS, Battle Force Pacific and finally more than a decade as an official of the CIA, I feel strongly that Mr. Brightson's attack on the competency of CIA's intelligence analysis and estimative staff must be answered by some one not be-mused by the tongue-in-check whimsies of James Bond and UNCLE and who has not only read more than a short serialization of The Penkovsky Papers, but actually worked with the original material.

As to "suspicious-looking sources" and Mr. Brightson's assumption that the estimators do not have access to the sources:

The information that flows into the analytical and estimative process comes from a wide range of sources-all varities of published materials and foreign broadcasts (65 foreign languages in daily use); photography, travel reports, items of equipment, etc. and, of course, clandestine agent reports.

The evaluation of these sources and the material supplied is performed by experts, and in the case of agent reports by those case officers who are closest to the agent net in question. All reports are accurately rated as to reliability of the source and as to the credibility of the material. If the need arises, there are not many cases where the intelligence analyst cannot be put directly in touch with the source.

As to the competence of the analyst and estimators-those "individuals without an immediate and intimate working knowledge of the subject mat-

Within the Board of Nation al Estimates and its staff ar prepared the periodic and a hoc estimates which go to the senior policy level in State and Defense, to the National Security Council, and to the President. Many of the mer on the Board and its staff date their intelligence experience from the early days of OSS, a most a quarter century ago others have come to the CIA from the military intelligence services and from the senio level of the academic com munity. Better than 90 pe cent have advanced academi degrees in fields of history political science, or economics directly pertinent to their work.

About 75 per cent have en hanced their area and subjec knowledge by residence over seas. In addition, the CIA fo years has had in operation program of sending analyst overseas on familiarizatio tours to compensate for lac of foreign residence. These a are men of dedication and highest competence, who hav individually devoted the major portion of their mature live to the study of the area o subject with which they now deal.

What new "more legitimat information-gathering ope ation," as suggested by Mi Brightson, could possibly ac quire such a wealth of talen and how long would it take Decades certainly.

Finally, perhaps I might sug gest to Mr. Brightson (and t others of like thinking) that in stead of James Bond, the read with some attention such authoritative books as Alle Dulles "Craft of Intelligence and Sherman Kent's "Strategi Intelligence," before recon mending abolition of the preent order and a possible r turn to the intelligence chac of the pre-World War II era.

PHILLIP G. STRONG,

Haciland, Vt.